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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Congress created the United States Sentencing
Commission' to respond to the perceived inconsistencies and
uncertainties of the indeterminant sentencing system.2 The
1. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat.
1988, 2017 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988)).
2. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989) (citing S. REP. No.
225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)). The purpose of the new Sentencing Guidelines
was to eliminate the disparities in sentences of similarly situated individuals and the
1
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Sentencing Commission is an independent body of the judicial
branch that promulgates sentencing guidelines.' The purpose
of the Sentencing Commission is to develop a determinant
sentencing system that achieves "retributive, educational, de-
terrent, and incapacitative goals." 4 In order to help achieve
these goals, the Commission developed the Sentencing Guide-
lines, which provide for variations in sentencing due to individ-
ual mitigating circumstances.5  The list of mitigating
circumstances specifically provides for downward deviations
from the prescribed sentence range for substantial assistance
to the government in the investigation or prosecution of
another.6
The question of what constitutes substantial assistance to
the government is placed, for the most part, in the hands of the
prosecutor. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, only the prose-
cutor may move the sentencing court for downward deviations
in sentences for substantial assistance in the prosecution of
others.7 Since 1989, the Eighth Circuit has struggled with this
grant of authority to the prosecutor and has recognized its
constitutional implications.8 In recognizing the significant po-
tential for abuse, the Eighth Circuit has determined that the
district court judge may review the facts leading to the prose-
cutor's decision only in cases where prosecutorial bad faith or
arbitrariness is alleged. 9
Other circuits have similarly struggled with the constitu-
uncertainty of the length of a prison term due to parole board discretion under in-
determinant sentencing. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1984).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5K2.0 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
6. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5KI.1. Cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) (1988) (using similar language for downward departures from statutory
minimums).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5KI.I, p.s.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349, 354 (8th Cir.), vacated, 917
F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 958 (1989).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc);
United States v. Laird, 948 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Drake, 942
F.2d 517, 519 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hubers, 938 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 427 (1991); United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349, 350-57
(8th Cir.), vacated, 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Oransky, 908 F.2d
307, 309 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smitherman, 889 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1036 (1990).
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tional implications arising from this grant of authority to the
prosecutor.'" The Supreme Court recently held that the sen-
tencing court may review the prosecutor's decision if constitu-
tional rights are implicated." This Note argues that allowing
downward deviations only upon a prosecutor's motion de-
prives defendants of their constitutional rights.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Sentencing Systems
Since the formation of the Union, criminal sentencing in the
United States has been subject to constant change. Prior to
the Revolutionary War, the prevailing sentencing theory was
based on a retribution model.' 2 This theory was designed to
advance punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation.' 3 At that
time, incarceration was not a sentencing option; capital pun-
ishment for felonies, and public beatings or hard labor for
lesser crimes, were common."
The first currents of reform came with the Revolutionary
War.' 5 At that time, two new theories of sentencing theory
10. See, e.g., United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990); United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484, 1487 (1 1th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989).
11. Wade v. United States, 60 U.S.L.W. 4389 (U.S. May 18, 1992), aft'g, 936 F.2d
169 (4th Cir. 1991). In Wade, the government refused to make either a § 5K1.1 mo-
tion or a § 3553(e) motion to depart from the set guideline range or the prescribed
statutory minimum sentence. In holding that the sentencing court has a right to re-
view the government's refusal to make the motions, the Court limited this review to
cases where the court considered unconstitutional factors, such as race or religion.
The Court held that the defendant must make a "substantial threshold showing" of
improper motive in order to trigger an evidentiary hearing on the matter. A claim of
substantial assistance or general allegations of an improper motive are insufficient.
Id. at 4390. The Court did not decide whether the § 5K1.1 departure motion and the
§ 3553(e) motion are identical requirements.
12. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 2, at 9 (1978).
13. Id.; see also United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1206 (11 th Cir. 1989)
(providing a narrative of the historical development of American sentencing), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1083 (1990).
14. See Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1206. In the eighteenth century, torture and capital
punishment were the accepted methods of punishment. Non-capital sentences, in-
cluding public floggings or brandings, simple fines, dismemberment and banish-
ment, were common. See CAMPBELL, supra note 12, § 2, at 9. Prisons were originally
old and abandoned ships. For example, San Quentin was built in its location simply
because it was the site of the shipwreck of a floating prison. See AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME IN AMERICA 34-35
(1971) [hereinafter STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE].
15. CAMPBELL, supra note 12, § 2, at 9.
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were advanced. The first theory was premised on the idea that
certainty of punishment was a more effective deterrent than
overly severe punishment.' 6 The second theory advanced the
belief that sentencing decisions should conform to principles
of reformation and rehabilitation.' 
7
The belief in the rehabilitation potential of offenders led to
the establishment of the first penitentiary and sentences of in-
carceration in Pennsylvania in 1786.18 Although incarceration
was largely substituted for capital punishment and public hu-
miliation sentences, the sentence was determined on the basis
of the crime, not the criminal.' 9
Criticism of this premise led to the adoption of the "medi-
cal" model of sentencing in 1869.20 Since then, all states have,
at one time or another, implemented the medical model of
sentencing. 2 1 In a medical model of sentencing, also referred
to as indeterminant sentencing, the offender is sentenced for
an undetermined period of imprisonment, subject to a certain
maximum.22 The actual period of imprisonment is based on
the offender's rehabilitative progress, as determined by a pa-
role board.23 The goal is the rehabilitation of the offender.24
Taking individual characteristics into account is an integral
part of the process.25 Accordingly, indeterminant sentencing
takes into consideration the offender's personality, social back-
ground, motivation for criminal conduct, and the potential for
16. Id. at 10-11.
17. Id. at 11.
18. Id. at 10 n.58. This represented the first step away from the torture that was
regularly inflicted on felons.
19. Id. at 10.
20. In 1869, the state of Michigan adopted the first medical model of sentencing.
See United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1083 (1990). The medical model of sentencing refers to a method of incar-
ceration which is designed to "cure" the offender of the ailment that causes him to
commit crimes. This method is designed to prepare offenders, through rehabilita-
tion, for re-entering public life as contributing members of society. Id. at 1206-07.
21. 17 SAGE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYsTEM ANNUALS 16-17 (Martin L. Forst ed., 1982)
[hereinafter SAGE ANNUALS].
22. Id. at 17.
23. Id. The philosophy behind the open-ended sentence is that it is impossible
for the sentencing judge to determine the length of time needed for individual reha-
bilitation. The sensible alternative is to allow parole boards and corrections experts
to judge when an offender can properly return to society. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
[Vol. 18
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effective correctional treatment. 26 Judges are not constrained
by the rules of evidence in determining which factors to con-
sider in imposing a sentence.27 Predictably, indeterminant
sentencing places broad discretion in the hands of the trial
court .2
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court endorsed the
medical model of sentencing. In Williams v. New York, the
Court stated, "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective
of criminal sentencing. Reformation and rehabilitation of
offenders have become the important goals of criminal
jurisprudence. "29
In the early 1960s, the increasing crime rate spurred grow-
ing concern and criticism of indeterminant sentencing. Indi-
vidualized sentencing was criticized as the public became
aware of discrimination and due process violations. 3' This
awareness led to the return of the retributive model of sen-
tencing, which focused on the crime rather than the individual
when determining the proper sentence.3 '
26. Id. at 15-16.
27. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). There, the Supreme Court
stated:
Highly relevant-if not essential-to [the judge's] selection of an appropri-
ate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning
the defendant's life and characteristics .... [A] sentencing judge [should]
not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a require-
ment of rigid adherence to the restrictive rules of evidence ......
Id.
28. SAGE ANNUALS, supra note 21, at 17; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 363 (1988).
29. Williams, 337 U.S. at 248. Although the medical model had been imple-
mented in most jurisdictions, this was the first case in which the Supreme Court rec-
ognized this shift in ideology.
30. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 8-10. There was recognition that
indeterminant sentencing was not as effective in reformation and rehabilitation as
was originally predicted. Additionally, experts acknowledged that the penal system
was an absolute failure in the rehabilitation of offenders. According to experts, the
system resulted in huge disparities in sentencing between similar cases, and created
biases in race, religion and social class. The rehabilitation methods were also
thought to be arbitrary and ineffective at lowering the recidivism rate. Id.; see also
United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1083 (1990); SAGE ANNUALS, supra note 21, at 18-19.
31. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1988) (stating that the
rehabilitation model was a failure). Minnesota initiated the return to the retributive
model when its sentencing guidelines took effect on May 1, 1980. ANDREW VON
HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 127 (1987).
1992]
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B. Sentencing Reform
As the crime rate in the United States rose and as disparities
in sentencing went unchecked in the federal courts, Congress,
following state legislative reforms, enacted the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984.32 Under the Act, the medical model of sen-
tencing was finally abandoned." The Act authorized the
creation of the United States Sentencing Commission, whose
function is to promulgate sentencing guidelines designed to
eliminate the inequities of indeterminant sentencing.34
The United States Sentencing Commission was established
as a permanent, independent, administrative agency within the
judicial branch of the federal government.3 5 To assist the
Commission in the task of promulgating its sentencing guide-
lines, Congress identified three basic objectives for the new
sentencing system. Above all else, the system was to be hon-
est, uniform and proportional for varying degrees of criminal
conduct. 36 The result was the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
which took effect on November 1, 1987. 37
In drafting the Guidelines, the Commission sought to mini-
mize deviations from the guideline sentencing range due to
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3587 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988); see also VON
HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 31, at 127 (providing a summary of state reforms).
33. VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 31, at 127. Prior to the passage of the Act,
"many federal judges [had] abandoned any attempt at fashioning sentences with re-
gard to an offender's rehabilitative potential, and [were] consider[ing] other goals
such as retribution and general deterrence." Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1207 n.8.
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, 995(a)(1) (1988).
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(a), 992(a), 992(b) (1988). The Commission is made up of
seven voting members, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Three of these members are currently sitting federal judges. No more than
four members may be of the same political party. The terms, except for the initial
staggering, are for six years each, and each member is limited to two terms. The
United States Attorney General is a non-voting member. Id.
36. U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § IA3. This section states in relevant part:
[To achieve honesty in sentencing, Congress] sought to avoid the confusion
and implicit deception that arose out of the preguidelines sentencing system
which required the court to impose an indeterminate sentence of imprison-
ment and empowered the parole commission to determine how much of the
sentence an offender actually would serve in prison .... Second, Congress
sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity
in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar of-
fenders. Third, Congress sought proportionality in sentencing through a
system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct
of differing severity.
Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 991-998 (1988).
[Vol. 18
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38unique characteristics of a particular case. To accomplish
this, the Commission developed an empirical formula which
accounts for certain extenuating circumstances. After factor-
ing in the extenuating circumstances, the formula provides an
"offense level" which determines the range from which ajudge
can select a sentence.3 9 Congress provided guidance to the
Commission for the creation of this formula by listing mitigat-
ing factors which were to be incorporated into the Guide-
lines.4 ° Judicial discretion is reserved within the sentence
38. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (1988). Congress directed the Commission to develop a
sentencing range "for each category of offense involving each category of defend-
ant." Id.
39. See United States v. Ruis-Villanueva, 680 F. Supp. 1411, 1415 (S.D. Cal.
1984), where the format of the Guidelines is described:
Offenses [are] grouped into 43 base levels, according to relative severity.
Recommended sentences for each base level [are] figured, after a review of
past sentencing practices. Consideration of certain aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances was allowed in order to take into account the gravity of a
specific crime. The Commission also categorized offenders into six groups
and on the basis of their criminal history. The Commission then plotted the
coordinates for offenses and offenders and produced a grid which sets out
sentencing ranges.
Id.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c), (d) (1988). The Act provides for consideration of offense
characteristics including:
(1) the grade of the offense;
(2) the circumstances under which the offense was committed which miti-
gate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense;
(3) the nature and degree of harm caused by the offense, including whether
it involved property, irreplaceable property, a person, a number of persons,
or a breach of public trust;
(4) the community view of the gravity of the offense;
(5) the public concern generated by the offense;
(6) the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the commission of
the offense by others; and
(7) the current incidence of the offense in the community and in the Nation
as a whole.
Id. § 994(c). The Act also provides consideration of characteristics of the offender, as
follows:
1) age;
2) education;
3) vocational skills;
4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that such condition miti-
gates the defendant's culpability or to the extent that such condition is
otherwise plainly relevant;
5) physical condition, including drug dependence;
6) previous employment record;
7) family ties and responsibilities;
8) community ties;
9) role in the offense;
10) criminal history; and
11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.
Id. § 994(d).
1992]
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range provided for each offense level.41
Departures from the Guideline's sentencing range are con-
trolled by section K of the Guidelines.42 Section K allows for
deviations beyond a prescribed range in extraordinary circum-
stances.43 Some courts interpret section K as legally binding,44
while other courts interpret section K as simply a policy state-
ment that allows for judicial sentencing discretion beyond the
set guideline ranges.4 5
Immediately after they took effect, the Sentencing Guide-
lines were challenged on constitutional grounds. Several
courts invalidated the Guidelines on separation of powers
principles, holding that the Sentencing Commission, by em-
ploying federal judges, usurped the powers reserved for the
legislative branch.46 The Supreme Court settled these chal-
lenges during the 1988 Term in Mistretta v. United States.4 7 The
Mistretta Court upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines,
finding that separation of powers principles were not vio-
lated.48 The Court advanced the view that, while sentencing is
not exclusively a judicial function, there was a " 'strong feel-
ing' that sentencing has been and should remain primarily a
judicial function. ' 49 Since Mistretta, most attacks on the Guide-
41. See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § IB1.I, which provides instructions for applying
the Guidelines in sentencing determinations.
42. See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5K.
43. Id.
44. See infra note 50.
45. See United States v. Amesquita-Padilla, 691 F. Supp. 277, 280 (W.D. Wash.
1988); see also U.S.S.G, supra note 5, § 1A4.b. In that section, the Commission stated
that it
intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a "heart-
land," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline de-
scribes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a guideline
linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm,
the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.
Id. The section then lists other sections of the guidelines which do not allow depar-
tures because the factors have already been sufficiently accounted for. Section 5KI. 1
is not among them.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Federico, 732 F. Supp. 1008, 1011-13 (N.D. Cal.
1988); United States v. Brittman, 687 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 871 F.2d
1093 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Elliott, 684 F. Supp. 1535, 1542 (D. Colo.
1988); United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1510-11 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
47. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
48. Id. at 384. The Court stated, "Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch
nonadjudicatory functions that do not trench upon the prerogatives of another
Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary." Id. at 388.
49. Id. at 390 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
[Vol. 18
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lines have been due process challenges." °
C. Due Process Rights in Sentencing
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that no
person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."" l Sentencing an offender to prison obvi-
ously deprives that person of his or her liberty. Consequently,
due process rights in sentencing have constantly been chal-
lenged and redefined.
1. Due Process Challenges Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act
The Supreme Court has recognized that the full due process
rights afforded the defendant at trial should also be provided
at sentencing.5 2 Prior to the Federal Sentencing Reform Act,
the Court held that the minimum requirements for due process
include written notice, disclosure of evidence to be considered,
the opportunity to be heard, the right to refute evidence con-
sidered, a neutral and detached hearing body, and a written
statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied upon in
the decisionmaking process.53 Because the trial judge was not
constrained by the rules of evidence in determining which fac-
tors to consider in arriving at a sentence,54 the Court held that
a judge "is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved in the
crime."55 The Court has recognized that a defendant's ability
to refute offered evidence is essential for a judge to determine
a fair sentence. 56
50. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 542-44 (10th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Bolding, 876 F.2d 21, 22 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Harris, 876
F.2d 1502, 1505 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1005 (1989); United States v. Pinto,
875 F.2d 143, 144 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Seluk, 873 F.2d 15, 16-17 (1st Cir.
1989); United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 828-29 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 865 (1989); United
States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Frank, 864
F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1095 (1989). But see United States v.
White, 869 F.2d 822, 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
52. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605 (1967).
53. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
54. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949).
55. Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143-44 (8th Cir. 1973) (quoting
Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959)).
56. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 840 (1I1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
19921
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Most of the cases where there was a due process challenge to
the indeterminant sentencing system involved cases where a
judge relied upon a presentencing report, prepared by the pa-
role board for the prosecutor, to aid in the sentencing deci-
sion.57 The contents of the report were kept confidential from
the defendant and his attorney.58 In one decision, the
Supreme Court held that this failure to disclose information
violated a defendant's due process rights. 59 Thus, the Court
recognized a defendant's constitutional right to know what fac-
tors were used in formulating a sentence.6 °
2. Due Process Challenges to the Sentencing Guidelines
Most of the due process challenges to the Sentencing Guide-
lines were based on the theory that due process provides a
right to an individualized sentence.6 The federal appellate
courts have uniformly rejected this contention.62
Prior decisions had recognized that Congress has the au-
thority to eliminate judicial discretion in sentencing.6 Under
the indeterminant sentencing system, judicial discretion was
broad. However, the parole board played the primary role in
determining the actual length of time served.' While sentenc-
ing is generally recognized as a province of the judiciary, Con-
gress may properly insist that the sentence be based solely on
the crime.6 5 Where a sentence is mandatory, any rights of indi-
471 U.S. 1117 (1985); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972) (find-
ing a sentence based on illegally obtained prior convictions invalid); Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (reversing a sentence based on untrue allegations).
57. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 353 (1977); Shelton v. United
States, 497 F.2d 156, 157 (5th Cir. 1974).
58. See Gardner, 430 U.S. at 353; Shelton, 497 F.2d at 158.
59. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358. "The defendant has a legitimate interest in the
character of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may
have no right to object to a particular result of the sentencing process." Id.
60. Id. at 362.
61. See supra note 50.
62. Id. The public policy argument has also been rejected on the grounds that it
is Congress' responsibility to set public policy in this area. Id.
63. See, e.g., Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1212 (3d
Cir. 1983) (stating that Congress may limit the authority to impose certain punish-
ments and set maximum and minimum terms without constitutional infringement),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
64. United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1083 (1990).
65. United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1112 (1989). There, the court stated, "Congress has the power to completely divest
[Vol. 18
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vidualization will result from a Congressional reservation of
discretion to the judiciary.6 6 Congress has provided such dis-
cretion by giving sentencing ranges within the Guidelines.
Any sentence imposed within the limits established by the Sen-
tencing Guidelines is reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard.67
The procedural due process rights afforded under the in-
determinant sentencing system apply to the Sentencing Guide-
lines. Although judicial discretion is greatly limited in the
choice of the sentence,68 the rights of full disclosure69 and ac-
tive participation in the sentencing process remain intact.7 °
D. Departures from the Prescribed Sentence Range
The Sentencing Commission was aware that there may be
some extenuating circumstances which cannot be accounted
for in the formulation of the offense level.7' Section K of the
Guidelines allows for the consideration of such extraordinary
circumstances. Section K is a policy statement that outlines the
situations in which a sentencing judge may find it necessary to
impose a longer or a shorter sentence.72
1. General Departures
Under section 5K2.0, a sentencing judge may depart from
the offense level sentencing range when "the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
the courts of their sentencing discretion and to establish an exact, mandatory sen-
tence for all offenses." Id. at 825 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602
(1978)).
66. Id.
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988); see also United States v. Lawrence, 915 F.2d
402, 405-06 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Johnson, 879 F.2d 331, 335 (8th Cir.
1989).
The Guidelines do not foreclose individual due process challenges to the way in
which the Guidelines are applied to specific cases. Where the application of the
Guidelines to the facts is incorrect, the appellate courts may remand for proper sen-
tencing within the Guidelines. United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 828-29 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1005 (1989).
68. United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143, 144 (7th Cir. 1989).
69. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967); United States v. Romano, 825
F.2d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1987); Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir.
1974).
70. Shelton, 497 F.2d at 159-60.
71. See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 1A4(b).
72. U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5KIl..
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kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration in
formulating the guidelines. 73 The policy statement continues
by listing numerous circumstances which may warrant either a
longer or shorter sentence.74
2. Departures for Substantial Assistance Under Section 5K1. 1
The enabling legislation and the Sentencing Guidelines ex-
plicitly provide for downward departures as a result of substan-
tial assistance to the authorities. 75  Both allow for downward
departures for substantial assistance "upon motion of the gov-
ernment. ' 76  In order to sentence outside the Guideline's
range for a particular offense level, the policy statement of sec-
tion 5KI.1 of the Guidelines states:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant
has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or
73. See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5K2.0; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(5), 3553(b)
(1988).
74. U.S.S.G., supra note 5, §§ 5K2.1 to 5K2.14. The Guidelines are based on a
charge offense system, rather than a real offense system. This means that the sen-
tence is based on the charge brought by the prosecutor, not the actual offense com-
mitted by the individual. See U.S.S.G. § IA4(a).
The original goal of the Commission was to develop a real offense system, but
practical complications mandated the charge offense system finally drafted. As a re-
sult, effectual departures are often made from the Sentencing Guidelines since the
offense level of a given crime is a major consideration in plea bargain situations. Plea
bargains generally reflect a virtual agreement of a sentence, corresponding to the
offense for which the plea is offered. Because of this, the sentence often bears little
resemblance to the offense or offenses actually committed. For a harsh commentary
on the final draft of the Sentencing Guidelines, see Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing
Systemfor the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1987).
75. U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5K1.1. The enabling legislation, 28 U.S.C. § 994(n)
(1988), provides:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appro-
priateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed,
including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a mini-
mum sentence, to take into account a defendant's substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5KI.I, p.s. Although
these sections are often equated with each other, it should be noted that U.S.S.G.
§ 5K1.1 is a policy statement and is intended to govern departures from the sentence
range allowed for a particular offense level. Courts are required only to consider pol-
icy statements when setting a particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (1988).
The enabling legislation, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988), however, is intended to govern
only the departures below the statutory minimum sentence of a given offense.
In Wade v. United States, 60 U.S.L.W. 4389 (U.S. May 18, 1992), the Court
declined to distinguish between the two requirements. In Wade, the statutory mini-
mum was near the top of the Guidelines range, which rendered the distinction
irrelevant.
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prosecution of another person who has committed an of-
fense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the
court for reasons stated that may include, but are not lim-
ited to, consideration of the following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness
of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the
government's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any in-
formation or testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the
defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.77
A reduced sentence is ultimately determined by the sentenc-
ing judge, who may consider the opinion of the prosecutor and
other mitigating circumstances offered by the parties. 78 At the
same time, the court may consider other factors for general
departures. 9
The majority of federal circuits have held that a prosecutor
must make a section 5K 1.1 motion before the court may make
a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines based
on substantial assistance.80 Some courts have recognized that
this restraint on the sentencing court's discretion has constitu-
tional implications.8 ' The Fifth Circuit, for example, has noted
that the "policy statement . .. does not preclude a district
77. U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5KI.I. Prior to 1990, the wording of this section
was slightly different. At that time, the section read: "Upon motion of the govern-
ment stating that the defendant has made a good faith effort to provide substantial
assistance .... U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § app. C.133 (1987) (emphasis added).
78. See United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484, 1487 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating
that the only delegation to the prosecutor is the ability to move for the departure; the
actual authority to depart remains in the sentencing judge), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022
(1989); see also United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that
without a § 5K1.l motion from the prosecutor, the assistance may be considered in
exercising discretion within the guidelines), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990).
79. See, e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 5, §§ 5K2.0 to 5K2.14. At least one judge on the
Eighth Circuit contends that section 5K2.0, an alternative section in the Guidelines,
may be used to depart downward for substantial assistance in the event that the pros-
ecution does not make a § 5K1.I motion. See United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748,
757 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. See supra note 50.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Hubers, 938 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 427 (1991); United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 958 (1989); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1112 (1989); United States v. Cruz, 729 F. Supp. 94, 95 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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court from entertaining a defendant's showing that the govern-
ment is refusing to recognize [his] substantial assistance.' '82
Further, the sentencing judge has always had a right to review
all available relevant information at sentencing."3 A defendant
has due process rights in the sentencing stages, including the
right to participate in a hearing and refute the evidence offered
by the prosecution. 4 These rights have not evaporated with
the demise of the medical model and a return to the retributive
theory of sentencing.
III. EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
A. Early Cases
The Eighth Circuit has confronted the section 5K 1.1 motion
issue several times.8 5 In United States v. Justice, 6 the Eighth Cir-
cuit recognized the difficulty in the prosecutorial motion
requirement:
While we recognize that § 5K1.1 allows the district court,
82. United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1112 (1989). Other courts have expressed similar discomfort with the § 5K.lI mo-
tion requirement. See United States v. Soliman, 889 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1989) (court
may consider sua sponte the defendant's allegations of substantial assistance to eval-
uate a downward departure); United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, modified sub
nom., United States v. Holland, 729 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd sub nom. on other
grounds, United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (ordering a hearing on
the extent of the substantial assistance and the procedure in evaluation of the Section
5K1.l motion decision); United States v. Curran, 724 F. Supp. 1239 (C.D. Il1. 1989)
(stating that the requirement of the motion is a violation of procedural and substan-
tive due process); United States v. Campbell, 704 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va. 1989) (sub-
stantial assistance was rendered, but the defendant made the § 5Kl.I motion, to
which the prosecutor concurred); United States v. Galan, No. 89 Cr. 198 (CSH), U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6383 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1989); United States v. Federico, 732 F. Supp.
1008 (N.D. Cal. 1988); United States v. Amesquita-Padilla, 691 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.
Wash. 1988); United States v. Schender, No. CR-87-00806-02, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8405 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 1988).
83. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-49 (1949).
84. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); United States v. Romano,
825 F.2d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1987); Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156, 160 (5th
Cir. 1974).
85. See United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United
States v. Laird, 948 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Drake, 942 F.2d
517, 519 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hubers, 938 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 427 (1991); United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349, 350 (8th Cir.),
vacated, 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Oransky, 908 F.2d 307, 309
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smitherman, 889 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1493 (1990); United States v. Grant, 886 F.2d 1513, 1514 (8th Cir.
1989).
86. 877 F.2d 664 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958 (1989).
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upon motion of the government, to depart below the guide-
lines to reward a defendant's cooperation, we are not posi-
tive that this provision, in the absence of a motion by the
government, would divest a sentencing court of the author-
ity to depart below the guidelines in recognition of a de-
fendant's clearly established and recognized substantial
assistance to authorities. We believe that in an appropriate
case the district court may be empowered to grant a depar-
ture notwithstanding the government's refusal to motion
the sentencing court if the defendant can establish the fact
of his substantial assistance .... 87
In Justice, the defendant alleged that he had provided sub-
stantial assistance to the government.8 8 The goverment did
not deny the allegations but nevertheless declined to make the
section 5Kl .1 motion.8 9 The Justice court criticized section
5K1.1's motion requirement. 90 First, the court found that the
motion gave the prosecutor discretion that has historically be-
longed to the sentencing judge.9' Second, the prosecutor's
decision was unreviewable.92 Finally, section 5KI.1 usurped
the province of the trier of fact in resolving the factual issue of
substantial assistance.93 Despite the Justice court's criticism of
the section 5K1.1 motion requirement, the court did not find
the defendant's rights were violated under the particular
facts.94
Subsequent Eighth Circuit cases addressing the section
5K 1.1 similarly declined to invalidate the prosecutorial motion
requirement. In United States v. Grant, the Eighth Circuit re-
served judgment on the "question of whether a prosecutor's
arbitrary or bad faith refusal to move for a Section 5Kl.I de-
parture violates due process."' 95 This reservation continued in
87. Id. at 668-69.
88. Id. at 665.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 667.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The constitutional issue was avoided by a finding that it was not properly
presented on appeal. The court stated that there was no apparent abuse of discretion
on the part of the district court in refusing the defendant's request for downward
departures. In dicta, however, it reserved the right to review the evidence leading up
to the prosecutor's decision. Id. at 669-70.
95. 886 F.2d 1513, 1514 (8th Cir. 1989).
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subsequent decisions by the Eighth Circuit. 96
B. United States v. Gutierrez
In United States v. Gutierrez,97 decided almost at the same time
as United States v. Oransky,98 a three-judge panel of the Eighth
Circuit reversed a section 5Kl.1 downward departure without
a government motion. In Gutierrez, the prosecution agreed to
dismiss charges in exchange for the defendant's cooperation
with the government in other drug-related investigations.99
The defendant agreed to identify his supplier and customers.
As part of his assistance, the defendant also testified against
another person.100
The prosecution asked the court to take the defendant's co-
operation into consideration within the Guideline's applicable
range, but it refused to make a section 5Kl.1 motion.' 0 ' The
defendant then requested a downward departure from the
Guidelines based on his assistance to the authorities.10 2 The
sentencing judge deviated from the Guidelines by six months
based on the defendant's motion and the judge's own knowl-
edge of the defendant's assistance.'0"
The government appealed the sentencing decision, and a
three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that a
government motion was necessary before a downward devia-
tion for substantial assistance was available.' 0 4 The panel deci-
sion identified two issues: first, whether a prosecutorial motion
96. See United States v. Oransky, 908 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Smitherman, 889 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1493 (1990).
In Oransky, Judge Heaney stated in his concurrence that a sua sponte downward
departure for substantial assistance should be allowed "if a question of prosecutorial
bad faith or arbitrariness is present." Oransky, 908 F.2d at 309-10 (Heaney, J., con-
curring) (citing United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349, 352-55 (8th Cir. 1990)
(Heaney, J., dissenting)).
97. 908 F.2d 349, vacated 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990).
98. 908 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1990).
99. Brief for Appellee at v, United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349 (8th Cir.)
(No. 89-1950), vacated, 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990).
100. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d at 349.
101. Brief for Appellant at 8, United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349 (8th Cir.)
(No. 89-1950), vacated, 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990).
102. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d at 350.
103. Id. at 352. The trial judge was David R. Hansen of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa. He had personal knowledge of the degree of assist-
ance which was given by the defendant because he presided over the trial of another
person whom the defendant testified against. Id.
104. Id. at 349.
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is required for a downward deviation for substantial assistance;
and second, whether this requirement constitutes a violation of
due process because it is made at the sole discretion of the
prosecutor, an adversarial party.' 05 The panel found that a
strict reading of the Guidelines and the enabling legislation re-
quired a section 5K1.1 motion by the prosecutor for downward
deviation from the Guidelines. 0 6 The panel did not reach the
second issue. 107
The decision was vacated, however, when a request for a re-
hearing en banc was granted. 08 After rehearing, an equally
divided court affirmed the district court.1
0 9
C. Recent Cases
In subsequent cases, the court has relied on dicta in United
105. Id. at 350-52.
106. Id. at 352. The enabling legislation states, "Upon motion of the Govern-
ment, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level estab-
lished by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed
an offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988). However, § 3553(e) is intended to be im-
posed on statutory minimum sentences, not downward deviations from sentencing
ranges. The section of the enabling legislation which applies to the policy statements
within the Sentencing Guidelines is § 3553(a)(5), which requires only that the court
consider the policy statements in determining the sentence. Id.
Many courts have equated § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e) and concluded that 5K1.I has
the same force of law. They have not recognized that § 3553(e) was intended only to
apply to deviations from statutory minimum sentences. See, e.g., United States v.
Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bruno, 897 F.2d 691 (3d Cir.
1990); United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alamin,
895 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 196 (1990); United States v. Fran-
cois, 889 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1822 (1990); United States
v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990); United States
v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1047 (1990); United
States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989).
But see United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958
(1989) (stating in dicta that the motion may not be absolutely essential where the
assistance is well established); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989)(stating that the 5K1.1 "policy statement does not pre-
clude a district court from entertaining a defendant's showing that the government is
refusing to recognize such substantial assistance").
107. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d at 351-52.
The dissent argued that the government motion was not required by § 5K1.I
because this section is a non-binding policy statement. The dissent found that such a
requirement would be unconstitutional because it restrained the defendant's proce-
dural and substantive due process rights. Id. at 353-54 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 355.
109. Gutierrez, 917 F.2d 379.
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States v. Justice" 0 and reaffirmed the prosecutorial motion re-
quirement in the absence of a showing of bad faith or arbitrari-
ness.1 " This retreat renders Gutierrez an anomoly. Recently,
in United States v. Kelley, the court again addressed the section
5K1.1 motion issue. 112 In an en banc decision, the Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court and found that a prosecutorial
motion is necessary for downward departure for substantial
assistance." 3 However, the constitutional due process issues
were not raised on appeal. 1" 4 Consequently, absent allega-
tions of bad faith or arbitrariness, a prosecutor's motion is cur-
rently required before a court may grant a downward
departure for substantial assistance in the Eighth Circuit. 1 5
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The requirement of a prosecutor's motion to trigger a down-
ward departure from the sentencing range for substantial
assistance leads to compelling constitutional arguments. First,
the section 5K1.1 motion requirement violates procedural due
process because of the great risk of an erroneous deprivation
of liberty. Second, in denying a sentenced offender the right
to appeal, the prosecutor's decision not to move for a down-
ward departure violates substantive due process. Third, the
discretion vested in the prosecutor violates separation of pow-
ers principles.
110. 877 F.2d 664, 668-69 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958 (1989).
111. See United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc);
United States v. Laird, 948 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Drake, 942
F.2d 517, 519 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hubers, 938 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 427 (1991).
112. Kelley, 956 F.2d at 748.
113. Id. at 757. The trial court judge in this case was Judge David R. Hansen of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. In holding that he was
without power to deviate downward without a prosecutorial motion, the court re-
versed the position it had taken in United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349 (8th Cir.),
vacated, 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990).
114. Kelley, 956 F.2d at 750 (stating "appellants forego constitutional arguments
and simply urge that we are not bound to follow United States Sentencing
Commission").
115. The Eighth Circuit now recognizes that § 5K1.I and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) do
not serve the same function. In United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, the court held that
where the prosecutor has made a § 5K 1.1 motion, the sentencing court still lacks the
authority to make a § 3553(e) departure. United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 958
F.2d 1441 (8th Cir. 1992).
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A. Procedural Due Process
Due process of law is a right granted to all individuals before
they may be deprived of a liberty interest." 6 The Supreme
Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge, stated that the right to be heard
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" is a funda-
mental requirement of procedural due process." 7 Mathews
identified three factors that should be considered in determin-
ing whether procedural due process requirements have been
met." 8 The first factor is the extent to which an individual's
constitutional rights are affected by the government's ac-
tions. 19 In sentencing cases, the affected right is a crucial
one-the defendant's right to liberty.1
2 0
Second, a court must also consider "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards."''2  The prosecutorial motion requirement
of section 5K1.1 deprives defendants of the right to place miti-
gating circumstances of substantial assistance before the court
for consideration of a smaller sentence. Because the prosecu-
tor's decision to make the motion is not appealable, any error
or abuse will not be reviewed or corrected. 2 2 This preclusion
violates the spirit of the Sentencing Guidelines and the en-
abling legislation.' 2 ' The Guidelines specifically allow the
court to consider downward departures where aggravating or
mitigating circumstances exist which have not been "ade-
quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines .... ,, 4 Due process grants
defendants the right to active participation in the sentencing
hearing, including the right to have the court consider any and
116. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
117. 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
118. Id. at 335.
119. Id.
120. See United States v. Johnson, 879 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that,
under determinant sentencing, the right to liberty is significantly and finally affected
because judicial discretion within the guideline range is broad and reversed only if
clearly erroneous).
121. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
122. See United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1374-75 (D.D.C. 1989), modi-
fied sub nom., United States v. Holland, 729 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd sub nom.
on other grounds, United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 5, §§ lA4(b), 5K2.0; see
also United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1014 (1st Cir. 1990).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
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all relevant factors in sentencing.125 Consequently, by restrict-
ing a defendant's participation and right to appeal, section
5K 1.1 increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.
Third, courts must consider "the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens" involved in instituting alternative procedures. 126
One of the government's interests is the encouragement of a
defendant's assistance in the prosecution of others. By requir-
ing the government to prepare and submit to the court an eval-
uation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, the court
could decide whether a downward departure was warranted.
Court evaluation of the defendant's assistance is always appro-
priate for sentencing determinations within the range of the
offense level. Therefore, the government's interest should be
minimally affected. Furthermore, the administrative burden
on the prosecutor is lessened where the decision whether to
make a section 5K1.I motion is answered by the court.' 27 Ad-
ditionally, placing the decision to depart with the court would
lead to a uniformity of decisions.1
28
The Third Circuit applied the Mathews test in United States v.
Frank, and held that no liberty interest was at stake in the sec-
tion 5K1.1 motion because a defendant does not have an es-
125. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605, 609-10 (1967); United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1987).
126. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
127. See United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (D.D.C. 1989), modified
sub nom., United States v. Holland, 729 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd sub nom. on
other grounds, United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In Roberts, the
evidence presented to the court regarding the degree of assistance rendered was not
disputed; the reason given for not making a § 5Kl.I motion was that "the enforce-
ment agencies did not pursue [defendant's] information because 'something bigger
... came up.'" 726 F. Supp. at 1376.
128. Compare United States v. Donatiu, 720 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aft'd, 922
F.2d 1331 (7th Cir. 1991), with United States v. Fiterman, 732 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill.
1989). These cases exemplify the dangers of vesting this authority in the prosecutor.
Both cases originated out of the same office at approximately the same time, yet in
Donatiu, the defendant made immediate efforts to render substantial assistance. He
was to make a drug delivery immediately after his arrest; the delivery was not com-
pleted because of extraneous circumstances beyond his control. The prosecutor did
not make a § 5K1.1 motion, and the sentencing court refused to depart downward on
the defendant's motion. Donatiu, 720 F. Supp. at 630.
In contrast, in Fiterman, the prosecutor made a § 5KI. motion in spite of the
defendant's minimal assistance a full year after her arrest. The sentencing judge re-
jected the § 5KI.I motion and imposed the maximum sentence under her offense
level. 732 F. Supp. at 883-85.
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tablished right to an individualized sentence.' 29  The Frank
court, however, failed to recognize that Congress has retained
elements of the individualized sentence by providing judicial
discretion within the sentencing ranges and allowing deviation
outside of the sentencing range where unusual circumstances
exist. '
30
Congress has an absolute right to eliminate judicial sentenc-
ing discretion.' However, a defendant has a protected liberty
interest in the downward departure provisions provided by
section K.'3 2 This view has been implicit in other decisions.
Allowing only one adversarial party to present information of
substantial assistance "skew[s] the sentencing process in a way
that cannot withstand due process scrutiny. "133 For example,
in United States v. Curran, the prosecutor did not file a section
5KI.1 motion because the defendant did not meet the re-
quired "profile" for the motion. 134 The court held that due
process requires that the court, or either party, may make the
5KI.1 motion or may offer evidence of prosecutorial
assistance. ' 3
5
B. Substantive Due Process
The right of review and appeal presents another problem in
the application of section 5K1.1. The right of a defendant to
129. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1008-09 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1095
(1989). The Frank Court stated, "The recognition of a substantial liberty interest in
individualized sentencing would... be inconsistent with the generally accepted no-
tion that both retribution... and general deterrence... are appropriate... reasons
for imposing sanction." Id. at 1009-10.
130. U.S.S.G., supra note 5, §§ IA4(b), § 5Kl.I. The Guidelines explicitly allow
for departures beyond the ranges for extenuating circumstances, at the sentencing
court's discretion. Id.
131. See supra Part II.C.2.
132. See United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989).
133. United States v. Curran, 724 F. Supp. 1239, 1244 (C.D. Il. 1989); see also
United States v. Galan, 1989 WL 63110, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1989).
134. 724 F. Supp. at 1241.
135. Id. at 1244 (once the "provision is made available to one party to the litiga-
tion, due process requires that it be made available to all parties in the litigation").
In considering the question of procedural due process, the Curran court dis-
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484 (1 1th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989). There, the court stated, "the only authority
delegated by the rule is the authority to move ... for reduction of sentence. ... The
authority to actually reduce a sentence remains in the district court ...." Id. at 1487
(emphasis added).
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appeal his or her sentence has been well established." 6 In
United States v. Federico, the court stated that sentencing is a
quintessential judicial function.' 7 As a judicial decision, the
sentence imposed will be subject to review on appeal.13 8 How-
ever, the decision of a prosecutor to forego a section 5K 1.1
motion is not a judicial decision and therefore is not
appealable. 
3 9
The right to appeal is basic to our system of government.
Many circuits have held that, in the event of alleged
prosecutorial bad faith or arbitrariness, the district court judge
should properly exercise discretion and review the facts lead-
ing up to the decision of whether or not a section 5K 1.1 mo-
tion was made. 14 ° In a recent case, the Supreme Court held
that where the government's motives are based on unconstitu-
tional factors, the sentencing court may review the prosecu-
tor's decision. 141
In United States v. Roberts, the court found that section 5K 1.1
was essentially a transfer of judicial power to the prosecutor
and was therefore unconstitutional. 42 The prosecutor's office
in that district, in an attempt to avoid unwarranted section
5K1.1 motions, instituted a "departure committee" within the
office for the purpose of evaluating section 5Kl.I depar-
tures. 143 The mechanism by which downward deviation mo-
136. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949); United States v. Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1067 (1989); Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1974).
137. 732 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
138. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 413-16 (1986).
139. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1926) (holding that process in which
the judge had "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" in the fines and con-
victions assessed deprived defendant of due process); United States v. Roberts, 726
F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1989), modified sub nom., United States v. Holland, 729 F. Supp.
125 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455
(D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Brennan, 629 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y.) (insisting on
elimination of prosecutorial influence in sentencing), aff'd, 798 F.2d 581 (2d Cir.
1986).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Hubers, 938 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 427 (1991); United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169, 171-73 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 635 (1991).
141. Wade v. United States, 60 U.S.L.W. 4389 (U.S. May 18, 1992); see supra notes
11, 76.
142. 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1366-68 (D.D.C. 1989), modified sub nom., United States v.
Holland, 729 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, United States
v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
143. Id. at 1361.
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tions were to be made was outside the individual prosecutor's
control.' 44 Further, the procedures used and the factors con-
sidered by the committee were unknown.'4 5 The decision
whether to make the section 5K 1.1 motion was completely un-
reviewable. The court found intolerable the placement of this
sentencing authority in the prosecutor, stating, "It is difficult
to conceive of a parallel situation in the law where substantial
liberty interests and consequences provided for by statute are
beyond the power of inquiry by anyone." '146
This concern was echoed by the court in United States v. Cur-
ran."'47 The Curran court criticized the appealability of the
prosecutor's decision by stating, "In the absence of special cir-
cumstances (e.g., a claim of denial of equal protection based
on some invidious classification, such as race), there is no
mechanism to challenge a prosecutor's decision not to file a
motion for reduction based on substantial cooperation."'
' 48
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Congress reserved the
right of limited discretion in sentencing to the judiciary. 149 By
giving any of this authority, no matter how slight, to the execu-
tive branch, the Sentencing Guidelines confuse the traditional
adversarial role of the prosecutor and makes possible cries of
collusion and unfairness in the sentencing process. In the
Guidelines, Congress has reserved the rights of discretion and
deviation within and without the sentencing range to the sen-
tencing judges.15 0
C. Separation of Powers
Most circuit courts, while finding that the section 5K 1.1 mo-
tion is mandatory, have criticized the requirement because of
144. Id. at 1376.
145. Id. at 1375-76.
146. Id. at 1375. The court further stated that
to substitute prosecutors for judges with respect to the sentencing responsi-
bility is no more compatible with due process than . . . prosecutorial as-
sumption of the other judicial] functions.... In the view of this court, none
of these can be accommodated in the traditional due process framework that
has existed in our law since the Magna Carta.
Id.
147. 724 F. Supp. 1239 (C.D. I1. 1989).
148. Id. at 1244.
149. U.S.S.G., supra note 5, §§ 1A4(b)-lA4(h).
150. United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1816 (1990).
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the adversarial role of the prosecutor.' 5' A number of courts
have invalidated statutes and procedures similar to section
5K1.1 on separation of powers principles. In Ford v. Wain-
wright, the Supreme Court held that a state procedure that
placed the final determination of capital punishment in the
hands of the governor was unconstitutional. 5 2 The Court
held that the procedure was flawed because the decision was
within the executive branch of government.'-" The Court held
that the governor, a law enforcement official, could not have
the proper degree of impartiality.' 54
Other courts also have recognized the need to separate
prosecutorial and judicial functions. The Supreme Court, in
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, found that the judiciary can-
not be at the mercy of another branch of government in fulfil-
ling its constitutional mandate. 55  The necessity of this
separation was discussed in United States v. Brennan.' 56 There,
the court stated that the many tools available to the prosecutor
for inducing the cooperation of defendants do not extend to
the sentencing process. 157 The government may use plea bar-
gaining or may point out the desirability of cooperation in the
form of a reduced charge, but it should not have the ability to
influence the sentencing formulation for its own ends.' The
primary purposes of sentencing-rehabilition and retribu-
tion-should be unaffected by the government's interests in
coercing assistance. Sentencing discretion, beyond the man-
dates of congressional standards, should lie in the discretion of
the judiciary.' 59
Some state courts have found that vesting discretion in the
prosecutor is impermissible where it ties the hands of the court
in an area where judicial discretion is not restricted.160 In Peo-
151. See, e.g., United States v. Hubers, 938 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 427 (1991); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1112 (1989); United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 958 (1989).
152. 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 481 U.S. 787, 793-96 (1987).
156. 629 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 798 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1986).
157. Id. at 304-05.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 305-06.
160. See, e.g., State v. Prentiss, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (Ariz. 1989); People v. Tenorio,
473 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1970).
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ple v. Tenorio, the California Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional a statute which allowed for dismissal only on motion of
the prosecutor.1 6' The court found that vesting the prosecutor
with such power did " 'violence to our concept of constitu-
tional government.' "162
In a similar case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a
state statute that does not allow mitigating circumstances to be
considered in sentencing, except upon the initiative of the
prosecutor, violates separation of powers principles. 6  The
court held that while the legislature has the power to deter-
mine what the law should be, the executive branch has the
power to determine which criminals to prosecute and which
charges to file.' 64 Thus, allowing the executive branch the au-
thority to decide whether a defendant should have the benefit
of circumstances which could reduce his or her sentence un-
constitutionally restricts the power of the judiciary.165 The law
allowed the executive branch to limit and review the discretion
of the judiciary. 166 By doing so, the statute unconstitutionally
violated separation of powers principles.
67
The section 5K 1.1 motion is similarly flawed. By vesting the
prosecutor with discretion to depart from the Guidelines, the
authority violates the role reserved to the judiciary by section
K. The separation of powers principle was applied to the sec-
tion 5K1.1 motion in United States v. Federico.'6' The Federico
court analyzed the traditional duty of the judiciary in the sen-
tencing process and noted that there is "no justification for
'vesting in a partial advocate, the prosecutor, the power to pre-
vent the exercise of ... judicial discretion.' "'169 By giving this
authority to the prosecutor, sentencing discretion is vested in a
party who is an adversary against that defendant and who, by
161. 473 P.2d at 996-97.
162. Id. at 995 (quoting People v. Sidener, 375 P.2d 641, 660 (Cal. 1962)).
163. State v. Prentiss, 786 P.2d 932, 937 (Ariz. 1989). This finding was made
under the due process clause of the Arizona Constitution, which mirrors the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Id.
164. Id. at 936.
165. See id.
The executive branch decides which evidence to offer at sentencing. The judici-
ary decides what the sentence will be. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 732 F. Supp. 1008 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
169. Id. at 1012 (citing to People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1970)).
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the very role assumed in the process, cannot be objective. 7 0
V. CONCLUSION
The section 5KI.1 prosecutorial motion requirement vio-
lates a defendant's constitutional rights. Depriving the defend-
ant of an opportunity to provide evidence of mitigating
circumstances is a violation of procedural due process. When
the executive branch usurps the role of the judiciary, and
where there is no appellate review of its decision, this transfer
of power violates substantive due process rights and separa-
tion of powers principles.
While the Sentencing Guidelines have generally protected
individual's constitutional rights and furthered public policy
objectives,' 7 ' the section 5K 1.1 motion requirement does not.
Only by interpreting the section as a non-binding policy state-
ment can the courts protect the individual's constitutional
rights.
Karen Bjorkman
170. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986); Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349 (1977); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1926).
171. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989).
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